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Functionalism

The term functionalism has been used in at least three different senses in the social
sciences. In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is a view about the nature of mental
states. In sociology and anthropology, functionalism is an approach to understanding
social processes in terms of their contribution to the operation of a social system. In
psychology, functionalism was an approach to mental phenomena which emphasized
mental processes as opposed to static mental structures.

Functionalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind was first systematically developed in the
1960s as a view about the nature of mental states such as sensations, beliefs, desires, and
emotions. It arose in response to questions about the relation between mind and body, in
the context of a debate between opposed views known as dualism and materialism.
Dualism was defended by the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes, who held
that minds were nonphysical substances which were not located in space and indeed had
no physical properties at all. A major difficulty for dualists has been to explain how
mental states, if they have no physical properties, can cause or be caused by physical
states of a person’s body. Materialists, by contrast, have held that there are no
nonphysical substances, and that mental states are nothing more than physical states.

The best-known materialist views in the 1950s were behaviorism and the identity
theory. Behaviorism as a theory of the nature of mental states is sometimes called logical
behaviorism to distinguish it from behaviorism as a methodological view in psychology.
According to behaviorism, mental states were simply tendencies to behave in certain
ways under certain circumstances. Behaviorists thus rejected not only dualism, but also
the common-sense view that mental states are internal states that are causes of behavior.
Identity theorists, on the other hand, held that mental states were identical with states of
the central nervous system. The identity theory appeared to rule out by definition the
possibility that mental states could be present in any being that did not have a human
central nervous system.
Functionalism was intended to be a theory that was compatible with materialism,
while avoiding the difficulties of behaviorism and the identity theory. It was motivated in
part by the thought that the relation between mind and body is analogous to the relation
between software and hardware in a computer. Computational states are defined, not in
terms of specific hardware configurations, but in terms of their relations to inputs,
outputs, and other computational states. Computational states are multiply realizable; that
is, they can be realized or implemented by a wide range of different kinds of hardware.
Functionalists held that a similar approach could be taken to mental states, i.e. that mental
states could be defined as relations between perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs, and
other functional states. For example, the beginnings of a functionalist analysis of pain
might point out that it is a state which is produced by potentially harmful sensory inputs,
leads to avoidance behaviors, and tends to produce such other mental states as a dislike

for whatever caused the pain. According to the functionalist, it is relationships such as
these, not a specific physical implementation, that are essential to pain.
Functionalism seems to avoid the difficulties of the other main approaches to the
nature of mental states. Because mental states, like computational states, must be
implemented in a physical medium, functionalism seems to make it less mysterious than
dualism how mental states can stand in causal relations with physical states of the body.
Unlike behaviorism, functionalism is compatible with the view that mental states are
internal causes of behavior. And unlike the identity theory, functionalism leaves open the
possibility that beings very unlike humans could nevertheless have mental states.
Different versions of functionalism have been developed by different writers. The
view described above most closely resembles the “machine functionalism” defended by
Hilary Putnam in a number of papers reprinted in his Mind, Language, and Reality
(1975). Somewhat different versions were defended by other writers; David BraddonMitchell and Frank Jackson offer a useful survey in their Philosophy of Mind and
Cognition (1996), and a number of the original papers are reprinted in Ned Block, ed.,
Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 (1980).
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is the problem of accounting for
conscious experiences, which philosophers call qualia. One thought experiment which
illustrates the problem involves the apparent possibility of “inverted qualia.” It seems
possible in principle that two people could be functionally identical even though their
experiences were inverted, so that when one person saw something green, that person had
an experience that felt to him or her the way an experience of something red felt to the
other. If this is a real possibility, it follows that functionalism cannot be a complete

account of the nature of all mental states, since if two people with identical functional
properties could nevertheless have different qualia, then qualia cannot be functional
states.

Functionalism in Sociology and Anthropology
In sociology, functionalism was a theoretical perspective that emphasized that the
parts of a social system are interrelated in such a way that none of them can be fully
understood except in terms of its effects on the others. The relationships between the
parts of a social system constitute the structures of that system, and these structures are to
be explained in terms of their functions, i.e. their contributions to the continued stable
existence of the system. The social systems to which functional analysis was applied
ranged from units as small as the family to those as large as international organizations;
the structures to which functions were imputed included social roles, social norms,
devices for social control, and many others.
Functionalism originated in the late nineteenth century in the work of such thinkers
as Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim; it was developed in the early twentieth century
as an approach to anthropology by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski;
and in the middle decades of the twentieth century, as elaborated by Talcott Parsons and
Robert Merton, it became the dominant perspective in American sociology.
Some functionalist writers were influenced by an analogy between societies and
biological organisms, and their concept of social function was explicitly modeled on that
of biological function. Radcliffe-Brown, for instance, in “Structure and Function in
Primitive Society” (1935, reprinted in Coser and Rosenberg, Sociological Theory, 1976),

distinguishes between three sets of sociological problems: “social morphology,” which
will identify social structures just as biological morphology identifies organic structures;
“social physiology,” which identifies the functions of these structures; and
“development,” which will study how new social structures arise, much as evolutionary
theory explains the development of new kinds of organisms.
Functionalists have typically thought of the function of a social activity as its
contribution to the needs of the society, especially to a social equilibrium which tends to
right itself if disturbed. Durkheim, in the first systematic development of a functionalist
approach, distinguished between the cause of an activity such as the punishment of crime,
on the one hand, and its function, on the other. The practice of punishment may initially
be caused by an intention to deter crime or achieve justice, but its function, according to
Durkheim, is to maintain our intense emotional disapproval of crime. Although a
particular practice or activity may not initially be caused by a recognition of the function
it will serve, Durkheim holds that its serving a useful function is nevertheless part of the
explanation of the continued survival of that practice.
The sociologists most closely associated with functionalism in the mid-twentieth
century were Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton. Parsons identified four functions which
any social system needs in order to achieve and maintain equilibrium. These were
adaptation, or the acquisition and distribution of resources from the environment; goal
attainment, which involves determining which goals of the system have priority and
determining how to achieve them; integration, which involves coordinating relationships
between various social actors to enable them to function smoothly together; and “latent
pattern maintenance-tension management,” which involves transmitting values which

will keep actors motivated to act in ways that are necessary for the continued functioning
of the system.
Merton’s contributions included his distinction between manifest functions, which
are consequences that agents in the system recognize and intend to produce, and latent
functions, which are not intended or recognized. Whereas Parsons had tended to
emphasize manifest functions, Merton stressed that many important functions are latent.
Merton also introduced the concept of dysfunctions, which are consequences of an
activity that have negative effect on the stability of the system.
By the 1980s, functionalism was no longer the dominant paradigm in sociology, in
part because of the perceived conservatism of its emphasis on equilibrium, and its
consequent lack of attention to social conflict and change, and in part because it was seen
more as a set of abstract categories than as a testable empirical theory.

Functionalism in Psychology
In psychology, the term functionalism refers to an American school of psychology that
was influential at the turn of the nineteenth century. Functionalism developed in response
to the earlier structuralist view advanced by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and Edward B.
Titchener (1867–1927). Structuralist psychology used an introspectionist methodology to
attempt to identify basic elements of conscious experience into which more complex
experiences, or structures, could be analyzed. Functionalism, by contrast, emphasized
psychological processes rather than static psychological structures. Functionalism also
stressed the role of the mind as a mediator between the environment and the needs of the
organism; like the pragmatist philosophy that influenced it, functionalism held that

psychological processes should be understood in terms of their effects. The most
influential contributors to this school were the pragmatist philosophers William James
(1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952), and the University of Chicago psychologist
James Rowland Angell (1869–1949). Although functionalism influenced later approaches
to psychology, as a distinct school it faded from view in the early decades of the
twentieth century, as behaviorism rose to prominence.
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